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Abstract—Advances in Artificial Intelligence and Image Pro-
cessing are changing the way people interacts with digital images
and video. Widespread mobile apps like FACEAPP make use of
the most advanced Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to
produce extreme transformations on human face photos such
gender swap, aging, etc. The results are utterly realistic and
extremely easy to be exploited even for non-experienced users.
This kind of media object took the name of Deepfake and raised
a new challenge in the multimedia forensics field: the Deepfake
detection challenge. Indeed, discriminating a Deepfake from a
real image could be a difficult task even for human eyes but recent
works are trying to apply the same technology used for generating
images for discriminating them with preliminary good results but
with many limitations: employed Convolutional Neural Networks
are not so robust, demonstrate to be specific to the context
and tend to extract semantics from images. In this paper, a
new approach aimed to extract a Deepfake fingerprint from
images is proposed. The method is based on the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm trained to detect and extract a fin-
gerprint that represents the Convolutional Traces (CT) left by
GANs during image generation. The CT demonstrates to have
high discriminative power achieving better results than state-
of-the-art in the Deepfake detection task also proving to be
robust to different attacks. Achieving an overall classification
accuracy of over 98%, considering Deepfakes from 10 different
GAN architectures not only involved in images of faces, the CT
demonstrates to be reliable and without any dependence on image
semantic. Finally, tests carried out on Deepfakes generated by
FACEAPP achieving 93% of accuracy in the fake detection task,
demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed technique on a
real-case scenario.
Index Terms—Deepfake Detection, Generative Adversarial
Networks, Multimedia Forensics, Image Forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
A digital image can be manipulated with many tools and
software. Everyone with a glimpse of experience in using
Photoshop or GIMP can forge photographs in order to change
their contents, the semantics and - potentially - everything.
However, this kind of forgery has been widely investigated
throughout recent years and commercial tools with the ability
to detect and describe them are also available [1], [2]. The
possibility to detect forgeries made with Photoshop or similar
tools are related to the experience of the image manipulator
being able to hide any kind of unrealistic artifact.
Advances in Artificial Intelligence, and specifically, the ad-
vent of Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [3], enabled
the creation and widespread of extremely refined techniques
able to attack digital data, alter it or create its contents
from scratch. These tools are able to obtain surprisingly
realistic results leading to the birth of the Deepfake images
phenomenon, or simply Deepfakes.
In general, a Deepfake is defined as a multimedia content
synthetically modified or created through automatic (or barely
controlled) machine learning models. Most state-of-the-art
techniques are able to do the face swap from a source im-
age/video to a target image/video. Recently, faces of showgirls,
politicians, actors, TV presenters and many others have been
the main protagonists of Deepfake attacks: one of the first
example is the famous face swap of Jim Carrey on top of
the the body of Alison Brie 1 (Figure 1a), or Mr. Bean and
Charlize Theron in the Deepfake version of the commercial
of J’adore 2 (Figure 1b), and again Jim Carrey instead of Jack
Nicholson in Shining 3 (Figure 1c), or Tom Cruise replacing
Robert Downey Jr. in Iron Man 4 (Figure 1d).
Deepfakes are not only involved in face-related tasks but
they could be engaged to swap or generate realistic places,
animals, object, etc. Indeed, this could bring disruptive in-
novation in many working areas, such as in the automotive
industry or in architecture, since it is possible to generate a
car or an apartment through dedicated GANs or in the film
industry where it is possible, when necessary, to replace the
face of a stuntman with an actor; but, on the other hand
it could lead to serious social repercussions, privacy issues
and major security concerns. For example, there are many
Deepfake videos connected to the world of porn used to
discredit famous actresses like EmmaWatson o Angelina Jolie,
or they can be used to spread disinformation and fake news.
Moreover, the creation of Deepfakes is becoming extremely
easy: widespread mobile apps like FACEAPP 5, are able to
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEar 6UtX9U
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZVdPJhBkqg
3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbzVhzNaTdI
4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDM69UEyM3w
5https://www.faceapp.com/
Fig. 1. Examples of Deepfakes: (a) Jim Carrey’s face transferred to Alison Brie’s body, (b) Mr. Bean is Charlize Theron in a Deepfake version of J’adore
commercial, (c) Jim Carrey instead of Jack Nicholson in Shining and (d) Tom Cruise Replaces Robert Downey Jr. in Iron Man.
produce transformations on human faces such gender swap,
aging, etc. The results are utterly realistic and extremely easy
to produce even for non-experienced users with a few taps on
their mobile phone.
It is clear that the Deepfake phenomenon raises a serious
safety issue and it is absolutely necessary to create new
techniques able to detect and counteract it [1], [4].
While detecting a Deepfake is difficult for humans, recent
works have shown that they could be detected surprisingly
easy by employing Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
specifically trained on the task. However, CNN solutions
presented till today, lack of robustness, generalizing and
explainability. They are extremely specific to the context in
which they were trained and, being very deep, tend to extract
the underlying semantics from images without inferring any
unique fingerprint. A detailed discussion about such limits will
be dealt with in the final part of the paper.
In order to find a unique fingerprint related to the specific
GAN architecture that created the Deepfake image, in this
paper an extension of our previous work [5] is presented.
The fingerprint extraction method based on the Expectation-
Maximization Algorithm will be furtherly discussed focusing
on its capabilities to extract the Convolutional Traces (CT)
embedded by the generative process. The CT could be em-
ployed in many related classification tasks but in this paper
the finalized pipeline for fakeness detection is finalized with
the adoption of a Random Forest classifier. Moreover, the
method was deeply tested for robustness with many attacks
carried out on images before the extraction of the CT. Also
generalizing was demonstrated by testing real images against
images generated by ten different GAN architectures, which is
the widest test carried out on the task till today. Comparison
with state-of-the-art methods demonstrated that the overall
approach achieves in almost all cases best classification results.
Moreover, we would like to highlight that different state-
of-the-art methods for Deepfake detection used approaches
based on CNN and these require extremely computational
demanding (both for hardware and for time needed), while
the proposed approach achieves excellent classification results
using only the CPU power of a common laptop.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents state-of-the-art Deepfake generation and
detection methods. The proposed approach to extract the
Convolutional Trace is described in Section III. Classification
phase and experimental results are reported in Section IV. In
Section V the proposed approach is demonstrated to be robust
to different attacks. Finally, obtained classification results were
compared with recent state-of-the-art methods in Section VI.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Deepfakes are generally created by techniques based on
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) firstly introduced by
Goodfellow et al. [3]. In [3], authors proposed a new frame-
work in which two models simultaneously train: a generative
model G, that captures the data distribution, and a discrimi-
native model D, able to estimate the probability that a sample
comes from the training data rather than from G. The training
procedure for G is to maximize the probability of D making a
mistake thus resulting in a min-max two-player game. Mathe-
matically, the generator accepts a random input z with density
pz and returns an output x = G(z,Θg) according to a certain
probability distribution pg (Θg represents the parameters of
the generative model). The discriminator, D(x,Θd) computes
2
Fig. 2. Schematic description of a GAN learning framework.
the probability that x comes from the distribution of training
data pdata (Θd represents the parameters of the discriminative
model). The overall objective is to obtain a generator, after the
training phase, which is a good estimator of pdata. When this
happens, the discriminator is “deceived” and will no longer be
able to distinguish the samples from pdata and pg; therefore
pg will follow the targeted probability distribution, i.e. pdata.
Figure 2 shows a simplified description of a GAN framework.
In the case of Deepfakes, G can be thought as a team of
counterfeiters trying to produce fake currency, while D stands
to the police, trying to detect the malicious activity. G and
D can be implemented as any kind of generative model, in
particular when deep neural networks are employed results
become extremely accurate. Through recent years, many GAN
architectures were proposed for different applications e.g.,
image to image translation [6], image super resolution [7],
image completion [8], and text-to-image generation [9].
A. Deepfake Generation Techniques for Faces
Advances in GAN architectures lead to different works
dealing with human faces. STARGAN, created by Choi et
al. [10], is a method capable of performing image-to-image
translations on multiple domains using a single model (e.g,
change hair color, facial expression). Many methods works in
the latent space representation in order to set constraints to
the attributes to be modified, an example is ATTGAN, created
by He et al. [11]. Cho et al. [12] proposed the ”group-wise
deep whitening-and coloring method” (GDWCT) for a better
styling capacity, obtaining a great improvement in the image
translation and style transfer task in terms of computational
efficiency and quality of generated images. The stage changes
when surprising results of Deepfake images were obtained
by Style Generative Adversarial Network (STYLEGAN) [13].
STYLEGAN was used to create the so-called ”this person
does not exist” website 6. Moreover, a few imperfect artifact
created by STYLEGAN were fixed by Karras et al. [14]
with improvements to the generator (including re-designed
6https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/
normalization, multi-resolution, and regularization methods),
creating the even more realistic images with the so called
STYLEGAN2.
B. Deepfake detection methods
A starting point to detect Deepfakes is indeed the analysis
in the Fourier domain which is a well known technique to
find anomalies for image forensics experts [15]. Indeed, some
Deepfake images, in the Fourier domain, after being processed
by a Discrete Fast Fourier Transform, show abnormal frequen-
cies distributions. This preliminary insight was detected by
Guarnera et al. [4] in which the authors tried preliminarly to
detect Deepfakes by means of well-known forgery detection
tools ([2], [15], [16]) with only few insights for future works as
results. The analysis in the Fourier domain was employed more
in deep by Zhang et al. [17] in a naive strategy achieved good
performances. Later, an interesting work known as FakeSpotter
was proposed by Wang et al. [18]. They described a new
method based on monitoring neuron behaviors of a dedicated
CNN to detect faces generated by Deepfake technologies. The
comparison with Zhang et al. [17] demonstrated an average
detection accuracy of more than 90%
Wang et al. [19] trained a ResNet-50 to discriminate real im-
ages from those generated by ProGAN [20] and demonstrated
that the trained model is able to generalize for the detection
of Deepfakes generated by other architectures than ProGAN.
They also demonstrate to achieve good robustness to JPEG
compression, spatial blurring and scaling transformations.
Jain et al. [21] proposed a work known as DAD-HCNN, a
new framework based on a hierarchical classification pipeline
composed of three levels to distinguish respectively real Vs
altered images (first level), retouched Vs GANs generated
images (second level) and finally, the specific GAN architec-
ture (third level). From the conducted tests, the framework
can detect retouching and GANs generated images with high
accuracy.
A reference dataset was introduced by Rossler et al. [22] as
a benchmark for fake detection. It is called FaceForensics++,
and is based mainly on four manipulation methods: two com-
puter graphics-based methods (Face2Face [23], FaceSwap 7)
and 2 learning-based approaches (DeepFakes 8, NeuralTex-
tures [24]).
By roughly considering literature in the field, it seems
like that Deepfake detection is an easy task, already solved.
However, analytical techniques based on frequency domain
still lack of accuracy and CNN techniques while achieving
good results tend to discriminate semantics more than GAN-
specific traces. Moreover CNN techniques are computation-
ally intensive and difficult to be understood or controlled
[25]. To overcome this, Guarnera et al. [5] proposed a
new analytical solution to extract an unique fingerprint from
images that was demonstrated to be specific to the GAN
that generated the image itself. In this paper, the technique
7https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
8https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap/
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will be presented in the mathematical details with furtherly
discussion on robustness and generalization, by means of
the many carried out experiments: the widest test cases,
as today, in the Deepfake detection task will be presented.
For this purpose we employed ten of the most famous and
effective Deepfake generation architectures: CYCLEGAN [6],
STARGAN [10], ATTGAN [11], GDWCT [12], STYLE-
GAN [13], STYLEGAN2 [14], PROGAN [20], FACEFOREN-
SICS++ [22], IMLE [26] and SPADE [27]. Figure 3 resumes
the differences of these techniques in terms of image size,
datasets used as input, goal and examples of generated images.
For each architecture 2000 images were generated.
III. EXTRACTING CONVOLUTIONAL TRACES
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) are used to gener-
ate Deepfakes. Once trained, the fundamental element involved
in the image creation is the generator G which is composed
of Transpose Convolution layers [28]. They apply kernels to
the input image, similarly to kernels in Convolutional Layer
but they act inversely in order to obtain an output larger but
proportional to the input dimensions. Thus, the image creation
pipeline is different from the pipeline commonly used in a
camera device in which each step introduces typical noise
that is then used for naive image forgery detection [15].
However, the image creation process related to the Trans-
pose Convolution layers of GAN should be consistent and
identifiable in local correlations of pixels in the spatial RGB
space. To find these traces, an Expectation-Maximization (EM)
algorithm [29] was employed in order to define a conceptual
mathematical model able to capture the pixel correlation
in the images (e.g. spatially) and discriminate between two
distributions: the expected one (natural) and others (possibly
Deepfake). The result of EM is a feature vector representing
the structure of the Transpose Convolution Layers employed
during the generation of the image, encoding in some sense
if such image is a Deepfake or not, thus it can be called
Convolutional Trace (CT).
The CT extraction techniques works as follows. The initial
goal is to extract a description, from input image I , able to
numerically represent the local correlations between each pixel
in a neighbourhood. This can be done by means of convolution
with a kernel k of N ×N size:
I[x, y] =
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,t ∗ I[x+ s, y + t] (1)
In Equation 1, the value of the pixel I[x, y] is computed
considering a neighborhood of size N ×N of the input data.
It is clear that the new estimated information I[x, y] mainly
depends on the kernel used in the convolution operation, which
establishes a mathematical relationship between the pixels. For
this reason, our goal is to define a vector k of size N × N
able to capture this hidden and implicit relationship which
characterizes the forensic trace we want to exploit.
Let’s assume that the element I[x, y] belongs to one of the
following models:
• M1: when the element I[x, y] satisfies Equation 1;
• M2: otherwise.
The EM algorithm is employed with its two different steps:
1) Expectation step: computes the (density of) probability
that each element belongs to model (M1 or M2);
2) Maximization step: estimates the (weighted) parameters
based on the probabilities of belonging to instances of
(M1 or M2).
Let’s suppose that M1 and M2 have different probability
distributions with M1 Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and unknown variance and M2 uniform. In the Expectation
step, the Bayes rule that I[x, y] belongs to the model M1 is
computed as follows:
Pr{I[x, y] ∈M1 | I[x, y]} =
=
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈M1} ∗ Pr{I[x, y] ∈M1}
2∑
i=1
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈Mi} ∗ Pr{I[x, y] ∈Mi}
(2)
where the probability distribution of M1 which represents
the probability of observing a sample I[x, y], knowing that it
was generated by the model M1 is:
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈M1} = 1
σ
√
2π
e
−
(R[x,y])2
2σ2 (3)
where
R[x, y] =
∣∣∣∣I[x, y]−
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,tI[x+ s, y + t]
∣∣∣∣ (4)
.
The variance value σ2, which is still unknown, is then
estimated in the Maximization step. Once defined if I[x, y]
belongs to model M1 (or M2), the values of the vector ~k
are estimated using Least Squares method, minimizing the
following:
E(~k) =
∑
x,y
w[x, y]
(
I[x, y]−
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,tI[x+ s, y + t]
)2
(5)
where w ≡ Pr{I[x, y] ∈ M1 | I[x, y]} (2). This error
function (5) is minimized by computing the gradient of vector
~k. The update of ki,j is carried out by computing the partial
derivative of (5) as follows:
∂E
∂ki,j
= 0 (6)
Hence, the following linear equations system is obtained:
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,t
(∑
x,y
w[x, y]I[x+ i, y + j]I[x+ s, y + t]
)
=
=
∑
x,y
w[x, y]I[x + i, y + j]I[x, y]
(7)
4
Fig. 3. Details for each image set used in this paper. On the right of each deep architecture’s name is reported a brief description. Input represents the
dataset used for both training and test phase of the respective architecture. Image size describes the image size of the generated Deepfakes dataset. As regards
FACEFORENSICS++ is concerned that for each video frame, the patch referring to the face, is detected and extracted automatically. This patch could have
different sizes. #Images Generated describes the total number of images taken into account for the considered architecture. Finally, image examples are
reported.
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Fig. 4. Overall finalized Deepfake detection pipeline. The dataset block represents an overview of input data used in this work (Real and Deepfake images). For
each image we apply EM algorithm on every channel (R,G,B) obtaining KR, kB , KG feature vectors; the concatenation of them gives the final representation
(K) of the input image: the so called Convolutional Trace (CT). Finally, the CT is employed to discriminate real from Deepfake images by means of Random
Forest.
The two steps of the EM algorithm are iteratively repeated.
The algorithm is applied to each channel of the input image
(RGB color space).
The obtained feature vector ~k is the desired CT and has
dimensions dependent on parameter α. Note that the element
k0,0 will always be set equal to 0 (k0,0 = 0). Thus, for
example, if a kernel k with 3×3 size is employed, the resulting
~k will be a vector of 24 elements (since the values k0,0
are excluded). This is obtained by concatenating the features
extracted from each of the three RGB channels.
The computational complexity of the EM algorithm can be
estimated to be linear in d (the number of characteristics of
the input data taken into consideration), n (the number of
objects) and t (the number of iterations) making it easily to
be computed in seconds on a common laptop.
Two aspects are of extreme importance: (i) the proposed
CT extraction technique does not need training, it is applied
on images and extracts a discriminative feature vector; (ii) the
CT extraction is not a deep learning architecture, thus it is not
able to encode high level information such semantics. This will
be demonstrated in the following Sections with experimental
tests.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF DEEPFAKES
In this Section, the Convolutional Trace (CT) extracted
by means of the technique presented in Section III, will be
demonstrated to have great discriminative power for the Deep-
fake detection task. Moreover, the independence on image
semantics will be demonstrated in this Section by testing
against Deepfakes not representing merely faces.
Experiments were carried out considering images created
by STARGAN [10], ATTGAN [11], GDWCT [12], STYLE-
GAN [13], STYLEGAN2 [14] and FACEFORENSICS++ [22]
for Deepfake of faces in conjunction with other four Deep-
fake architectures not dealing with faces: CYCLEGAN [6],
PROGAN [20], IMLE [26] and SPADE [27]. Figure 3 shows
a brief presentation of the employed images, the techniques,
targets, semantics, etc. by reporting also details about training
and testing purposes.
STYLEGAN images 9 and STYLEGAN2 images 10 were
downloaded from the official websites, while, for images of the
other architectures, the pre-trained models were employed to
generate them. The CT was extracted from all the images with
kernels of increasing sizes (3, 5 and 7). The CT obtained was
employed as input feature vector for different naive classifiers
(K-NN, SVM, LDA) with different tasks: (i) discriminating an
authentic image from one generated by a specific GAN and
(ii) discriminating authentic images from Deepfakes (binary
classification - Real Vs Deepfake images generated by all the
10 techniques). We achieved the best classification solution
by employing Random Forest as a final binary classifier, thus
finalizing the pipeline (Figure 4).
Let’s first analyse the discriminative power of the CT
in order to distinguish authentic images from each of the
considered GAN. Figure 5 shows a visual representation by
means of t-SNE [30]: it is possible to notice how Deepfakes
can be “linearly” separable from authentic samples. Moreover,
in most cases the separation is utterly clear. Figure 5 visually
demonstrates the discriminative power of the extracted CT
which, if used as feature vector in a classification task, obtains
excellent results as expected. All the classification results are
reported in Table I. In particular, it is possible to note that:
9https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/STYLEGAN
10https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/STYLEGAN2
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TABLE I
OVERALL ACCURACY BETWEEN CELEBA VS. EACH OF THE CONSIDERED GAN. RESULTS ARE PRESENTED W.R.T. ALL THE DIFFERENT KERNEL SIZES
(3x3, 5x5, 7x7) AND WITH DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS: KNN, WITH k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13}; LINEAR SVM, LINEAR DISCRIMINANTANALYSIS (LDA).
ATTGAN CYCLEGAN FACEFORENSICS++ GDWCT IMLE
Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size
3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7
3-NN 92.62 82.92 81.51 93.59 86.74 87.29 97.31 84.74 80.70 91.38 72.19 72.49 97.76 97.19 94.73
5-NN 92.99 84.47 80.21 93.33 86.64 87.63 96.98 84.21 78.57 91.08 75.03 73.54 97.69 96.93 94.64
7-NN 92.99 85.20 80.47 93.25 85.85 86.50 96.56 83.68 79.07 91.08 75.60 75.53 97.39 96.85 94.64
9-NN 92.71 84.68 80.47 93.25 85.66 86.84 96.56 82.95 79.07 91.58 75.71 75.00 97.24 96.59 94.25
11-NN 92.90 84.68 79.56 93.00 85.07 86.50 96.47 81.89 79.07 91.48 75.48 74.34 96.94 96.50 94.06
13-NN 92.52 84.99 78.91 92.32 84.97 85.94 96.31 81.79 79.07 91.28 75.94 73.68 96.42 96.59 94.06
SVM 90.19 88.51 87.11 78.90 83.20 90.33 92.70 84.74 83.33 89.30 77.30 80.95 95.67 97.27 95.40
LDA 90.47 87.47 86.59 77.05 83.30 89.65 92.28 84.53 81.70 88.90 77.41 82.01 95.00 96.59 94.64
PROGAN SPADE STARGAN STYLEGAN STYLEGAN2
Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size
3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7
3-NN 95.70 83.38 78.76 96.72 78.35 84.96 88.40 82.08 83.73 94.62 99.48 98.95 96.58 98.06 98.82
5-NN 95.85 82.24 81.08 96.64 78.35 85.15 88.10 82.31 83.46 95.29 99.35 99.12 96.91 98.06 99.15
7-NN 95.54 83.86 82.08 96.27 79.20 85.15 87.88 81.63 82.41 94.72 99.35 99.12 96.80 97.93 99.32
9-NN 95.47 83.10 82.19 95.90 80.05 85.06 88.47 82.42 82.28 94.52 99.35 99.12 96.58 97.93 99.15
11-NN 95.16 82.43 81.53 95.90 79.11 83.81 88.54 82.42 82.28 94.24 99.35 99.12 96.69 97.93 99.15
13-NN 95.39 83.10 82.19 95.90 79.71 84.20 88.25 82.08 82.94 94.14 99.35 99.12 96.48 97.93 99.15
SVM 86.78 80.72 85.18 90.00 83.63 89.46 88.54 84.43 90.55 93.56 99.22 98.77 96.26 99.64 99.32
LDA 86.47 80.91 83.96 88.58 82.69 88.70 87.80 84.32 89.76 93.18 98.82 99.30 96.69 99.03 98.82
Fig. 5. Two-dimensional t-SNE representations (CELEBA: red; DeepNetwork: blue) of all kernel sizes for each classification task: (a) CELEBA ATTGAN; (b)
CELEBA STARGAN; (c) CELEBA GDWCT; (d) CELEBA STYLEGAN; (e) CELEBA STYLEGAN2; (f) CELEBA - SPADE; (g) CELEBA - PROGAN;
(h) CELEBA - IMLE; (i) CELEBA - CYCLEGAN; (j) CELEBA - FACEFORENSICS++.
• CELEBA Vs ATTGAN the maximum classification
accuracy of 92.99%, was obtained with KNN (with K
= 5, 7), and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs CYCLEGAN the maximum classification
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accuracy of 93.59%, was obtained with KNN (with K =
3), and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs FACEFORENSICS++ the maximum clas-
sification accuracy of 97.31%, was obtained with KNN
(with K = 3), and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs GDWCT: the maximum classification ac-
curacy of 91.58%, was obtained with KNN (with K = 9)
and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs IMLE: the maximum classification accu-
racy of 97.76%, was obtained with KNN (with K = 3)
and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs PROGAN: the maximum classification
accuracy of 95.85%, was obtained with KNN (with K
= 5) and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs SPADE: the maximum classification accu-
racy of 96.72%, was obtained with KNN (with K = 3)
and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs STARGAN: the maximum classification
accuracy of 90.55%, was obtained with linear SVM, and
kernel size of 7x7.
• CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN: the maximum classification
accuracy of 99.48%, was obtained with KNN - K = 3,
and kernel size of 5x5.
• CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN2: the maximum classification
accuracy of 99.64%, was obtained with linear SVM, and
kernel size of 5x5.
This leads to an empirical hypothesis: the kernel size used
by output layers in Deepfake generation techniques is related
to the kernel size parameter employed by the CT extraction ap-
proach. However, it has to be noted that, on average the kernel
size of 3x3 achieves best results among all the classification
tests.
Another interesting insight is that the extracted CT is able to
discriminate between images from STYLEGAN and STYLE-
GAN2: a binary test carried out to discriminate between im-
ages from the two “similar” techniques achieved a maximum
accuracy of 99.31% (Table II). As stated by the authors of the
STYLEGAN2 architecture, they have only updated parts of the
generator G, in order to remove imperfections of the original
STYLEGAN. This further confirms the former hypothesis,
since even a slight modification of G, leaves different traces
in the images generated and the CT is able to extract such
fingerprint.
We also employed binary classification between real images
and Deepfakes coming from all the 10 architectures taken
into account. At first, another t-SNE representation was built
in order to understand sample separability and distribution
in two-dimensional plane. Figure 6 shows that, in this case,
samples cannot be linearly separated thus we carried out
tests looking for non-linear classifiers. Indeed, final results
demonstrated and confirmed such insights. Best accuracy score
was obtained by employing Random Forest properly chosen
as the final step of the Deepfake detection pipeline (Figure 4)
with a solid 98% of accuracy (Table III) obtained in our tests.
In this Section, experimental results and t-SNE visual-
izations demonstrated the discriminative power of the CT
TABLE II
ACCURACY VALUES FOR BINARY TEST BETWEEN STYLEGAN AND
STYLEGAN2WITH DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS AND KERNEL SIZES (3x3,
5x5, 7x7).
STYLEGAN
Vs
STYLEGAN2
Kernel Size
3x3 5x5 7x7
3-NN 89.36 90.51 87.24
5-NN 89.56 89.87 85.52
7-NN 89.16 90.93 87.59
9-NN 88.55 89.87 87.93
11-NN 88.35 90.30 87.24
13-NN 89.36 89.66 87.93
SVM 91.77 99.16 99.31
LDA 91.16 98.73 98.28
TABLE III
ACCURACY VALUES OBTAINED IN THE BINARY CLASSIFICATION TASK
BETWEEN REAL IMAGES VS. IMAGES GENERATED BY 10 DEEPFAKE
ARCHITECTURES. RESULTS ARE REPORTED WITH DIFFERENT KERNEL
SIZES (3x3,, 5x5, 7x7) AND CLASSIFIERS TRAINED ON 70% OF THE
DATASET AND TESTED ON THE REMAINING PART. RESULTS ARE THE
AVERAGE ACCURACY VALUE OBTAINED ON A 5-FOLD CROSS VALIDATION
TEST.
CELEBA
Vs
DeepNetworks
Kernel Size
3x3 5x5 7x7
3-NN 89.80 77.38 78.63
5-NN 90.79 77.20 77.80
7-NN 90.44 76.47 78.39
9-NN 90.30 77.20 78.28
11-NN 89.80 77.29 77.45
13-NN 89.73 77.66 77.69
SVMLinear 84.14 76.28 80.28
SVMSigmoid 58.57 61.36 63.52
SVMrbf 91.22 80.04 80.87
SVMPoly 88.74 78.66 78.87
LDA 83.50 77.38 78.98
Random Forest 98.07 93.81 91.22
extracted from Deepfakes. Moreover, the CT achieves good
results in detecting Deepfakes not representing faces, hence
demonstrating CT being independent to semantics. To further
evaluate the proposed pipeline we employed an additional
classification test: detecting Deepfakes created by the famous
mobile app FACEAPP.
Recently, the mobile application called FACEAPP is having
a lot of success due to the ability to change features of the
input image of a face such as gender, age, hair style, etc. The
images thus produced are utterly realistic. Hence, a test for
automatic detection of Deepfakes produced by FACEAPP has
been carried out employing the CT extraction method and the
Random Forest classifier already trained for the test previously
described. No further training was done on FACEAPP images.
For experiments a dataset of Deepfake images was created
starting from CELEBA images by using the Android version
of FACEAPP (we employed the paid version that does not
introduce watermarks on images): 471 images were generated
with FACEAPP by applying gender swap on original images.
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Fig. 6. Two-dimensional t-SNE representation (CELEBA: red; All 10 DeepNetworks: blue) of a binary classification problem (with different kernel size):
CELEBA Vs All 10 DeepNetworks.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. (a) Example of images generated by FACEAPP with correct classification (deepfake) (b) Example of images generated by FACEAPP with incorrect
classification (real).
CTs were extracted with kernel size 3x3 and employed as
input for the pre-trained Random Forest classifier. Among the
471 images, 437 were correctly classified as Deepfakes while
34 images were classified as real faces. Figure 7a shows two
examples of correct classifications while Figure 7b shows two
examples of misclassification. It has to be noted that incorrect
classifications are probably due to low light conditions or
too few changes in the original images thus making difficult
to extract a discriminative CT. According to the reported
results we proved the effectiveness of the proposed Deepfake
detection technique in a real-case scenario.
V. ROBUSTNESS EXPERIMENTS
Finally, we introduce further tests about overall robustness.
A series of attacks were made at different Deepfake im-
ages of faces generated by ATTGAN, GDWCT, STARGAN,
STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2 and real images (CELEBA).
In particular, the following attacks were carried out:
1) Adding one rectangle with different sizes, positions and
colors at random: in this way details are removed. Since
the CT extracts information from pixel correlations, the
addition of this rectangle could lead to errors. This
could happen specifically for STARGAN or ATTGAN
considering that they change only few elements in a
face (e.g. hair color) and if these elements are removed
by the rectangle low classification accuracy values are
expected;
2) Adding Gaussian Blur with different kernel sizes (3x3,
9x9, 15x15): the noise added to the images could destroy
the pixels correlation created by Deepfake architectures
and remove the CT;
3) Rotating images by 45, 90, 180 degrees: rotations could
lead to interpolation transformation with modification on
CTs similar to the Gaussian blur attack;
4) Scaling images (+50%, -50%): due to the interpolation
operations carried out, information will be added or
removed. CT extracted from images with high details
(such as those of STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2)
would be more robust to this type of operation;
5) JPEG compression with quality factor equal to 50:
in general, a compression operation (such as JPEG)
removes high frequency information which could be
of major importance for the CT discriminative power.
Moreover, a JPEG compression with Quality Factor 50
9
Fig. 8. Examples of real (CELEBA) and deepfake images of faces (ATTGAN, GDWCT, STARGAN, STYLEGAN, STYLEGAN2) with six different kind of
attacks: Random Square, Gaussian Blur, Rotation, Scaling and JPEG Compression.
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TABLE IV
ROBUSTNESS TO ATTACKS: TABLE REPORTS ACCURACY VALUES OBTAINED (PERCENTAGE) FOR THE BINARY CLASSIFICATION TASK (REAL VS.
DEEPFAKES) EMPLOYING THE FINAL CLASSIFICATION SOLUTION FOR EACH DIFFERENT KERNEL SIZE (3X3, 5X5. 7X7). THE FINAL CLASSIFIER WAS
TRAINED ON THE AUGMENTED DATASET (70% OF DATA FOR THE TRAINING SET) AND 5-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATED. THE FIRST ROW REPRESENTS THE
ACCURACY OBTAINED BY THE TRAINED robust CLASSIFIER WITHOUT ANY ATTACK.
ATTGAN GDWCT STARGAN STYLEGAN STYLEGAN2
Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size
3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7 3x3 5x5 7x7
Raw
Images
92.99 88.51 87.11 91.58 77.41 82.01 88.54 84.43 90.55 95.29 99.48 99.30 96.91 99.64 99.32
Random
Square
82.54 75.47 75 62.03 61.54 63.27 81.16 78.95 76.19 97.26 100 97.37 99.02 100 100
Gaussian Blur.
kernel size = 3x3
77.78 73.58 72.22 56.96 59.38 61.22 73.91 80.7 61.9 93.15 98.33 92.11 96.08 98.81 96.08
Gaussian Blur.
kernel size = 9x9
76.19 76.92 68.57 56.96 67.19 61.22 72.46 77.19 64.29 97.26 100 94.59 96.08 97.62 94.12
Gaussian Blur.
kernel size = 15x15
80.95 76.92 77.14 64.56 67.69 57.14 82.61 80.7 75.61 97.26 98.33 94.59 100 97.59 98.04
Rotation
45
90 84.31 85.29 67.53 73.02 66.67 85.29 82.14 87.8 89.04 91.67 91.89 97.4 94.2 97.62
Rotation
90
100 94.23 100 93.59 92.19 93.75 92.75 92.98 97.56 100 100 97.3 100 100 100
Rotation
180
83.87 86.54 82.86 74.36 67.19 59.18 84.06 91.23 78.57 100 100 91.89 97.03 98.8 98.04
Scaling
+50%
88.71 78.43 91.18 78.21 71.88 68.09 89.71 83.93 90 97.22 100 97.3 99 98.78 100
Scaling
-50%
75.81 78.85 77.78 71.79 57.81 68.09 79.71 64.91 64.29 95.83 96.67 100 99.01 97.59 94.23
JPEG
Compression
86.69 91.67 91.18 85.17 89.33 84.66 89.17 92.69 92.01 99.5 99.33 97.57 99.49 98.96 98.55
is similar to those applied by social networks such as
Facebook or Instant Messengers like Whatsapp [31],
making this test another real-case scenario.
Once the above mentioned filters are applied individ-
ually to images, the CT extraction method was applied
and Real Vs Deepfake classifications carried out against
each GAN (e.g. CELEBARandomSquare Vs GDWCTRandomSquare,
CELEBAGaussianBlur Vs STARGANGaussianBlur, etc.).
The classification results are reported in Table IV 11.
Figure 8 shows an example of images obtained after
operations listed before. It is possible to observe that the
dataset plays a fundamental role: the output of ATTGAN,
STARGAN and GDWCT and the output of STYLEGAN and
STYLEGAN2 after the Gaussian Blur operation: images from
ATTGAN, STARGAN and GDWC show a greater visible blur
(and therefore a worse visual quality with greater lack of
details) respect to STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2 images.
This is mainly determined by the capability of STYLEGAN
and STYLEGAN2 to create images of a bigger size.
Results reported in Table IV show that the CT extracted is
robust to almost all considered attacks.
In particular, as stated before, STYLEGAN and STYLE-
GAN2 images obtained the best classification accuracy values
(Real Vs Deepfake) due to their bigger original size. GDWCT,
which creates the smallest images (Figure 3), is the least robust
to attacks and maintains a proper accuracy result comparable
with results without attacks only for JPEG compression.
11We report in this table the maximum accuracy classification value
obtained through k-NN (with k = {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13}), LDA (Linear Dis-
criminant Analysis), SVM (Support Vector Machine) with linear kernel and
Random Forest
However, another interesting insight comes from the rotation
attacks: a rotation of 90 degrees anticlockwise, which is a
rotation that does not introduce interpolation, unexpectedly
produces better classification results for each of the considered
Deepfake architecture. This could be related to a specific major
direction of the CT and should be better investigated in future
works.
VI. COMPARISONS WITH DEEPFAKE DETECTION METHODS
Section II presented a detailed discussion of the state-of-
the-art in the field of Deepfakes and specifically in Section
II-B the detection methods available as today were discussed.
While analytical techniques based on frequency domain still
lack of accuracy, CNN based techniques seems to achieve good
results but tend to be context-dependent, prone to overfitting
and provably depending to high-level semantics extracted
from images. Moreover, CNN techniques are computationally
intensive and difficult to be explained or controlled. In [25]
the authors discussed this limit about CNN. We carried out
tests with a deep neural network VGG-1612 - on spatial and
frequency domains - to solve the binary classification task
(Real Vs All 10 Deepfakes) on the datasets described above,
obtaining the best result equal to only 53% of accuracy (similar
to the random classifier). Better results are achievable by only
a complex deep neural network architecture, is what done by
recent state-of-the-art methods. The more the architecture is
complex and the more is not only an higher computational
power is necessary but it is more complicated understand what
are the high level features that the network used (probably
12https://github.com/1297rohit/VGG16-In-Keras
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the proposed approach (Our) vs. FakeSpotter [18] and AutoGAN [17].
Fig. 10. Comparison of the proposed approach (Our) vs. Wang et al. [19].
these features are focused on differences in eye sizes, a-
symmetries, etc.) to distinguish Real Vs Deepfakes images.
In this Section a detailed discussion is carried out, com-
paring results obtained by the proposed approach with the
best literature methods: Wang et al. [18] (the authors of
FakeSpotter), Zhang et al. [17] (the authors of AutoGAN) and
Wang et al. [19] were taken into account for comparisons in
the Real Vs. Deepfake binary classification task.
For FakeSpotter and AutoGAN, Deepfakes from STYLE-
GAN, STYLEGAN2, STARGAN, PROGAN and FACE-
FORENSICS++ architectures were taken into account. Results
of this comparison are reported in Figure 9. It is possibile
to note that, not only we obtained accuracy values of over
90% in all cases, but we overcame FakeSpotter on the aver-
age accuracy evaluation. Only in the case of PROGAN and
FACEFORENSICS++ we obtained a slightly lower value.
In Wang et al. [19], the following seven Deepfake ar-
chitectures were taken into account for a fair comparison:
PROGAN, STYLEGAN, CYCLEGAN, STARGAN, SPADE,
IMLE, FACEFORENSICS++. Wang et al. reported results in
the binary classification task as Average Precision between
different datasets: images with no data augmentation; images
with Gaussian blur added; images JPEG compressed; images
both blurred and JPEG compressed. Figure 10 shows the
comparison results obtained by Wang et al. and the proposed
approach, reporting the Average Precision (AP) and mean
Average Precision (mPA) values for each different Deepfake
architecture. It is possible to note that the proposed method
obtains better results specifically on Deepfakes of SPADE,
IMLE and CYCLEGAN: architectures that do not produce
images of faces, furtherly demonstrating the robustness of the
extracted CT and classification pipeline to semantics of the
image.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, a finalization of a former work on analysis
of Deepfake images was presented. An algorithm based on
Expectation-Maximization was employed to extract the Con-
volutional Traces (CT): a sort of unique fingerprint useable
to identify not only if an image is a Deepfake but also the
GAN architecture that generated it. The CT extracted is a
fingerprint demonstrated to have high discriminative power,
robustness to attacks and independence to high-level concepts
of images (semantics). Obtained results demonstrate also to
overcome the state-of-the-art with a technique simple and fast
to be computed. Indeed the CT is related to the generation
process of images and further better results can be obtained
by rotating input images in order to find the most important
direction. This particular hint will be investigated in future
works.
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